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Purpose: In this study we assess and analyse the effectiveness of Audit Committees within 
Maltese Listed Companies with respect to the following five determinants: composition, 
authority and resources, diligence, internal audit contribution and assessment.  
Design/Methodology/Approach: In order to ensure that the objective was achieved, this 
study adopted a qualitative mixed-method approach to collect data. Sixteen semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with ten Maltese Listed Companies representatives, four External 
Auditors and two Regulators.  
Findings: The findings indicate that there is still some disagreement as to the extent of 
Maltese Audit Committee Effectiveness. The appointment of Audit Committee members is left 
to the discretion of the Board, which tends to appoint the Non-Executive Directive to the 
Audit Committees without sufficient considerations for their competences and possibly their 
effective independence. Additionally, Audit Committees might be over-burdened with 
extremely varied objectives and with insufficient resources for them to reach all such 
objectives.  
Practical Implications: Audit Committee meetings held by Maltese Listed Companies seem 
to surpass the minimum requirement stipulated by law and this is perceived to be 
contributing to their effectiveness. Moreover, although Internal Audit Functions  are seen as 
fundamental for Audit Committees to reach their objectives, the lack of a statutory 
requirement to establish IAFs is probably negatively impacting Audit Committee 
Effectiveness.  
Originality/value: Finally, although there seems to be a general opinion that Audit 
Committees assessment is necessary, the introduction of tighter regulation, such as a 
statutory requirement to introduce an independent third party in such process, is likely to 
encounter opposition. 
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The audit committee (AC) is an integral and essential part of the corporate 
governance (CG) of an organisation. Its function is essential for a company to 
perform well and ensure its long-term standing. Moreover, it has been argued that 
certain corporate failures, which happened during the past three decades, could have 
possibly been avoided or their implications reduced had there been the appropriate 
oversight and governance, which the AC can help to implement (Vera-Muñoz, 
2005). Therefore, a number of new regulations and guidelines have been issued 
which enhance the responsibilities of the AC, especially since the financial crisis. It 
is thus worthwhile to obtain a thorough understanding of the performance, 
effectiveness and applicability of such laws and regulations in the Maltese scenario, 
particularly because studies show that Maltese companies tend to perceive audits – 
and specifically, internal audits – as an added overhead expense of the company, 
rather than a value-adding activity (Farrugia, 2006). 
 
The primary aim of this study is to assess and analyse the effectiveness of ACs 
within Maltese Listed Companies (MLCs). To achieve this, this study assessed the 
effectiveness of Maltese ACs with respect to the following determinants, 
composition, authority and resources, diligence, internal audit contribution and 
assessment. Although, this study is conducted in Malta, a small island state in the 
European Union, similarly to various authors such as Bezzina et al. (2012; 2014), 
Briguglio (1995), King (1993) have used islands as small scale laboratories for more 
complex politics, regulations and policies of larger countries. It sheds light on the 
somewhat ambiguous perceptions that seem to prevail regarding the effectiveness of 
Maltese ACs. It also puts forward relevant recommendations to assist companies in 
deriving more value from their ACs and to prompt regulatory authorities to specify 
additional guidance in certain areas.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 Audit Committee Effectiveness 
 
According to Kalbers and Fogarty (1993) effectiveness is seen as the technique and 
skill with which the AC undertakes its distinct monitoring roles. In fact, later, 
DeZoort et al. (2002) defined Audit Committee Effectiveness (ACE) as follows: 
„An effective audit committee has qualified members with the authority and 
resources to protect stakeholder interests by ensuring reliable financial reporting, 
internal controls, and risk management through its diligent oversight efforts.“ 
 
After evaluating the principle determinants of ACE, DeZoort et al. (2002) very 
effectively summarised the most prominent ones into four dimensions, which 
influence ACE. The four dimensions are: Composition, Authority, Resources and 
Diligence (DeZoort et al. 2002). The composition, authority and resources available 
to the AC will form the steady base for the AC to function effectively and are, as 
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described by DeZoort et al. (2002), the “basic inputs” necessary to achieve 
effectiveness. On the other hand, diligence is the process through which the AC 
transforms these given inputs into the necessary work needed to be effective 
committees for their firms. Moreover, communication with and access to the IA is 
seen as one of the most important resources available to the AC to be able to execute 
its functions (Audit Committee Institute [ACI] 2017). It falls upon the AC to 
establish and maintain a culture in which the IA feels free to openly discuss matters 
with the AC, especially if obtaining the support of management would not be 
possible (BRC, 1999). Therefore, the internal audit contribution is considered to be 
another determinant of ACE. Finally, a regular assessment of the AC is needed to 
determine whether it has been effective in meeting its objectives (ACI, 2017). As 




Bromilow and Keller (2011) argue that the degree of ACE depends primarily on the 
structure and communication between its members. 
 
2.2.1 Appointment of Audit Committee Members  
The Maltese Listing Rules specify the requirements that need to be adhered to when 
setting up and sustaining an AC by mandating that it “should be composed entirely 
of Non-Executive Directors (NED)s and having at least three (3) members” (Listing 
Authority – Malta 2019, S5.117.1). According to Collier (1993), in various 
corporations, the NEDs are immediately appointed as part of the AC and remain 
members as long as they remain on the Board. On the other hand, the AC’s 
chairperson is often chosen by the Board or else recommended by the AC and 
officially appointed by the Board (Camilleri 2016, Collier 1993).  
 
However, in its guidance to ACs, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) (2016) 
specified that it is the responsibility of the Board to appoint members to the AC from 
the nominees put forward by the Nomination Committee. Since such Committee 
holds a prominent position within the organisation, it would retain the sufficient 
knowledge to decide what is best for the company (Baldacchino, Gatt et al. 2018) 
and may also consult with the AC chairperson about prospective members.  
 
2.2.2 Size of the Audit Committee 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Listing Rules specify that an AC should be 
composed of at least three members. In fact, Camilleri (2016) as well as Micallef 
(2015), concluded that Maltese ACs comprise between three to six members 
depending on the size of the company in question.  
 
Furthermore, the composition of the AC is also likely to influence the number of 
meetings. As the number of members increases, it is probable that more issues arise, 
requiring further discussion and thus further meetings (Raghunandan and Rama 
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2007). Moreover, larger ACs contribute more oversight and thus, require further 
meetings to review and assess the financial report’s quality (Al-Najjar, 2011). 
 
2.2.3 Audit Committee Member Expertise 
Listing Rule 5.117 paragraph 3 continues to specify that “at least one member of the 
audit committee shall be competent in accounting and/or auditing” but provides no 
further clarification as to what level of competence would suffice (Listing Authority 
– Malta 2019). The BRC (1999), in its report addressed to ACs to help improve their 
effectiveness, defined expertise as previous employment in accounting, having an 
academic certificate in accounting or anything similar which allows the 
understanding of the core financial statements. Micallef (2015) agrees with the BRC 
and states that such a criterion is “not only satisfied by an accountant, but by an 
individual with a financial mind”. The rationale of having a financial expert on the 
committee is that the members would be in a better position to comprehend the 
judgements passed by the auditor and to rectify any dispute between internal 
management and the External Auditor (EA) (Mangena and Pike 2005). DeZoort et 
al. (2002) in fact, go on to say that AC member expertise is an essential prerequisite 
for ACE.  
 
Moreover, with the EU’s audit reform, the European Parliament (EP) set out a new 
requirement with regards to the composition of ACs. In this regard, Listing Rule 
5.118  states that the AC “as a whole” should be competent in the specific sector in 
which the firm is operating (Listing Authority – Malta 2019). The fact that the 
legislation specifies that it is the AC ‘as a whole’ which needs to satisfy this 
requirement is very important, as it implies that not all members need to be 
knowledgeable in the sector. Indeed, a number of ACs actually have members 
proficient in other sectors in order to widen their knowledge base and skills 
(ECODA, PwC 2016). In order to assess whether this requirement is satisfied, the 
FEE (2016) suggest that the shareholders of the firm should analyse whether the AC, 
as one committee, would manage to comprehend the complexities presented by that 
industry.  
 
2.2.4 Independence  
It is necessary that the AC is independent of the firm and its management in order to 
execute its monitoring role and safeguard shareholders’ interests (Bédard et al. 
2004). Camilleri (2016) agrees, stating that an independent member would be 
unrestricted to freely discuss all issues without feeling obliged toward certain 
individuals. In fact, more than half of the AC members should be independent of the 
organisation (Listing Authority – Malta 2019, S5.117.2). However, both the 
Directive and the Regulation fail to clarify what makes an AC member independent. 
The FEE (2016) states that such a determination should be “principles-based” and 
argues that the Board may look at whether that member: has any economical or 
personal relationship with management, is a close family member of the top 
management of the firm or has a significant business relationship with the firm 
itself, among other criteria. Moreover, Ferreira (2008) argues that ‘independence’ is 
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of such importance that it should be the principal condition when appointing new 
AC members.  
 
2.3 Authority and Resources  
 
The authority of the AC is essentially a result of its “responsibilities and influence” 
(DeZoort et al. 2002). AC’s roles and responsibilities are always evolving and 
increasing and so is its authority (DeZoort et al. 2002). However, the fundamental 
responsibility of the AC is to safeguard the interests of shareholders and aid the 
Board in carrying out their function in an effective and efficient manner (Listing 
Authority – Malta 2019). 
 
2.3.1 Selection of the External Auditor  
Within the EU, the EP, through the Regulation, made the AC responsible for 
recommending to the Board a suitable (EA) for the entity. In its recommendation, 
the AC needs to put forth a minimum of two EAs and highlight its preferred one 
with suitable justification (FEE, 2016). Moreover, Listing Rule 5.127.5 mandates 
that the AC is responsible for overseeing the independence of the EA giving 
particular attention to “non-audit services” provided by the EA to the firm (Listing 
Authority – Malta 2019).  
 
Although the provisions within SOX were intended to diminish the impact of 
management association in the auditor selection process, Dhaliwal et al. (2015) 
found that management affiliation still impacted this process substantially in the 
post-SOX period. Such results are consistent with Looknanan-Brown (2011) who 
found that an EA previously affiliated with management was more likely to be 
chosen by the AC. 
 
2.3.2 Overseeing the Financial Reporting Process  
Under Listing Rule 5.127.1 the AC is also responsible for “monitoring the financial 
reporting process and submitting recommendations or proposal to ensure its 
integrity” (Listing Authority-Malta, 2019). Whereas it is management’s 
responsibility to ensure that the financial reports are true and fair, it is the AC’s role 
to ascertain that management is upholding its duties (Braiotta et al., 2010). The AC 
should ensure that the process is adhering to the applicable accounting framework 
and that all necessary disclosures have been included (Camilleri, 2016). The 
rationale behind such a function is that effective monitoring of the reporting process 
by the AC should lead to better quality and timely disclosure of financial 
information (Rochmah Ika and Mohd Ghazali, 2012). In essence, the AC must 
evaluate that the financial statements are clear, complete and transparent for the 
users to be able to understand them and to make appropriate decisions based on the 
information provided.  
 
To be able to perform this role appropriately, management needs to keep the AC 
informed with any changes in the standards used and the treatment of complex 
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transactions (ACI, 2017). As such, an efficient “two-way dialogue” needs to be 
present between the AC and the CFO, however the AC may also make use of the 
EA’s support in recognising issues of quality and reliability in the financial 
statements (ACI, 2017). If any part of the financial reporting process fails to satisfy 
the AC, then it should report this to the Board (FRC, 2016). 
 
2.3.3 Monitoring Internal Controls and Risk management Systems  
The ultimate responsibility of monitoring ICs and risk management (RM) systems 
lies with the Board, however, the Board may decide to entrust the AC to assist in 
meeting this function (FRC, 2016). The Listing Rules go a step further as to mandate 
this as one of the responsibilities of the AC with the ultimate clause that, the AC 
must carry out such role without infringing on its independence (Listing Authority – 
Malta, 2019).  
 
In relation to RM, normally the AC would not have the expertise to oversee all the 
risks, prompting the Board to delegate them to different committees. However, the 
AC should have a fundamental role in monitoring financial risks. With financial risk 
comes fraud risk and although it is not the function of the AC to identify and prevent 
fraud risk, it should supervise and be satisfied with the antifraud IC systems put in 
place by management (Bujno et al., 2018).  
 
It is important to note however that, more companies, especially large firms, public 
organisations and financial services firms are now creating a “management-level 
risk committee” and delegating the oversight of RM process to this committee rather 
than to the AC (Beasley et al., 2019). 
 
2.3.4 Unrestricted Right to Resources  
Adequate monitoring hinges on the AC having the necessary resources it needs to 
fulfil its function (DeZoort et al., 2002). The FRC (2016) states that all the required 
resources must be provided to the AC for it to perform its function. The basic 
resources that the AC needs to function include financial as well as other 
information and it is essential that the AC has full and unrestricted access to such 
information. Such resources must be made available well in advance of the 
scheduled meetings to allow enough time for members to analyse and assess the 
information (Braiotta et al., 2010). DeZoort et al. (2002) postulate that a reasonable 
number of meetings together with access to the Board, management, EAs, IAs and 
the firm’s legal counsel are among the resources required by the AC.  
 
Furthermore, a strong relationship between the EA and the AC aids both parties in 
undertaking their responsibilities (FEE, 2016). The BRC (1999) argues that only 
through continuous and confidential communication with the EA, can the AC make 
use of the information gathered through the statutory audit, especially with regards 
to ICs. To this effect, the 2006 SAD made it a requirement that the EA presents a 
report to the AC explaining the results of the external audit. Such a prerequisite was 
further enhanced through the Regulation (FEE, 2016). To help improve such a 
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relationship, the FEE (2016) also suggests that the EA is invited to be present at the 
AC’s meetings.  
 
2.4 Diligence  
 
Diligence is the process by which ACE may be achieved. Kalbers and Fogarty 
(1993) define diligence as “the persistence with which audit committee members 
apply their desire to carry out their duties”. Although diligence has multiple facets, 
most studies in this area focus solely on the number of AC meetings. This is 
understandable since many of the proxies of diligence are complex to measure and 
witness in practice (DeZoort et al., 2002). The Maltese Listing Rules specify that the 
AC shall meet not less than four times per year (Listing Authority – Malta 2019, 
S.5.131). In fact, the majority of Maltese ACs meet between five to six times a year 
however, more ad hoc meetings may be held, especially during an audit cycle 
(Camilleri, 2016; Micallef, 2015). It is also imperative that the chairman ensures 
there is a “free and open” debate during such meetings and that they are not taken 
over by management (FEE, 2016). In fact, Braiotta et al. (2010) states that 
management should not be present at the AC meetings.  
 
As the number of meetings increases, the oversight function becomes more effective 
and the financial performance is enhanced (Aldamen et al., 2012). All in all, more 
frequent AC meetings enhance financial reporting adequacy and external audit 
quality (DeZoort et al. 2002).  
 
2.5 Internal Audit Contribution 
 
Internal Audit Functions (IAFs) should be set up in organisations to continuously 
monitor fundamental controls and processes (Cadbury, 1992). Hence, the IAF could 
be fundamental in assisting the AC in carrying out its responsibilities, specifically 
that of supervising the ICs of the company. The AC can employ the competence and 
knowledge of the IAF, by combining the capacity of its work, its supplies and 
priorities (Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors, 2015). The Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA) argued that the IAF is the third line of defence, in that: “Internal 
auditors provide the governing body and senior management with comprehensive 
assurance based on the highest level of independence and objectivity within the 
organization.” (IIA, 2013; p. 5). 
 
Being the final line of defence, the IAF should be independent from management in 
order to supervise the remaining two lines of defence ultimately aiding the AC 
(Roussy  and Rodrigue, 2016). In fact, the ECIIA and FERMA (2014) also argued 
that the AC should repeatedly invite the IA to attend its meetings to present the 
independent assurance. The IAF’s reporting lines need to be established clearly, with 
the different personnel responsible for audit, reporting to the head IA, who in turn 
should report to the AC chairman (Le Riche, 2014). Moreover, a strong relationship 
between the IAF and the AC is essential, where the AC provides clear targets of 
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focus as well as the required support for the IAF’s continuous functioning 
(Cavaleros, 2013).  
 
2.6 Assessment   
 
The AC should carry out a regular assessment of its own performance, its plans for 
future work as well as its communication with both the Board and external auditors. 
The method of assessment used by the Board and the AC should be left to their 
discretion and as such, it is common that they self-evaluate (ACI, 2017). 
 
However, due to the greater significance and importance that has been given to the 
AC, it is questionable whether the AC should conduct only a self-evaluation or 
whether it should consider assessment from some external stakeholders (FEE, 2016). 
Since all ACs differ depending on the culture and CG of their own organisation, 
there is no one process of assessment which will fit all ACs. Nonetheless, there are 
certain recommended guidelines, including that the evaluation procedure should be 
independent of managerial influence (ACI, 2017). Therefore, third-party assessment 
of the AC should perhaps be given greater consideration. 
 
3. Research Methodology 
 
3.1 The Research Tool 
 
The research instrument most appropriate to achieve the pre-determined objectives 
of this study is deemed to be the semi-structured interview (SSI). An interview 
schedule is used with standardised questions and probes, over which the interviewer 
has some control. This ensures that all the intended material is covered by the 
researcher (Harrell and Bradley, 2009). Furthermore, interviewees are unrestricted to 
answer the open-ended questions as they desire and since all participants are asked 
the same set of questions, the data obtained can be analysed and compared 
quantitatively.  Moreover, the unique structure of the SSI allows it to be employed in 
mixed-method research (Mcintosh and Morse, 2015).  
 
The interview schedule developed for this research study consists of seven sections 
and was targeted at internal auditors (IAs), chief financial officers (CFOs) and 
external auditors (EAs) of MLCs as well as the local regulators of ACs. The 
interview schedule consisted of a combination of both closed-ended and open-ended 
questions. A five-point Likert Scale, with ‘0’ being strongly disagree/not sufficient 
at all/highly ineffective and ‘4’ being strongly agree/highly sufficient/ highly 
effective was employed for the closed-ended questions.  
 
3.2 The Sample Population 
 
For the purpose of this study a list of all equity-listed companies on the Malta Stock 
Exchange (MSE) was obtained from the MSE website. Ten (10) interviews were 
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conducted with representatives of MLCs comprising mainly of heads of internal 
audit (IA) and one CFO (C) and four (4) interviews were carried out with audit firm 
representatives (EA) from the Big 4 firms. These professionals were chosen as the 
target population for the research study as they are the main users of ACs and 
actively participate in AC meetings. Two (2) other interviews were held with the 
regulators (Regulator) of ACs - an official from the Malta Financial Services 
Authority (MFSA) and an official from the Accountancy Board since their 
participation was deemed to aid in better understanding the effectiveness, or lack 
thereof, of Maltese ACs. Interviews were stopped as saturation was reached and no 
further value could be added by another interview. 
 
3.3 Data Analysis 
 
Qualitative data was obtained through the open-ended questions and also further 
comments and explanations given to the Likert scale ratings of the closed-ended 
questions by the interviewees. A question-by-question summary of the transcripts 
was drawn-up and the similarities and discrepancies were highlighted using the 
thematic analysis approach (Braun and Clarke, 2006). The Friedman Test was used 
to relate the mean rating scores provided to each statement of the Likert scale 
questions. This test’s main purpose is to assess whether the mean rating scores 
provided by interviewees to the statements vary significantly or not. The Mann-
Whitney Test was then employed to compare the mean rating scores provided by the 
different groups of interviewees and to identify any disparities between their 
responses. Furthermore, the Spearman Test was used to analyse the strength of the 
relationship between selected questions and the last question of the interview 
schedule.  
 
4. Findings And Discussion  
 
4.1 Determinants of Audit Committee Effectiveness  
  
Interviewees were asked to rate their agreement with six determinants extracted from 
the literature upon which factors the AC degree of effectiveness may depend.  
 
4.1.1 The Availability of Internal Audit 
Respondents clearly considered the availability of an IAF as being the highest 
determinant and in fact strongly agreed (x̅=3.88) that this primarily impacts the audit 
committee effectiveness (ACE). Nonetheless, although also agreeing to such 
availability, one Regulator cautioned that even with this, the AC is not rendered 
“bulletproof”.  
 
4.1.2 The Composition of Acs 
Interviewees strongly agreed (x̅=3.69) that the composition of ACs is another 
determinant. Two IAs (internal auditors) clarified that nowadays it is essential to 
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have members who are competent in finance and, even more importantly in IT so 
that adequate importance is placed on cyber-security. 
 
4.1.3 The Diligence of Acs 
Interviewees strongly agreed (x̅=3.63) that diligence also impacts ACE. Although 
agreeing, one IA  added that ACs cannot be diligent if they lack the trust of their 
Board and management. Conversely, one Regulator was neutral on this, explaining 
that effectiveness depends more on “asking the right questions” than diligence.  
 
 
4.1.4 The Authority of ACs 
Interviewees strongly agreed (x̅=3.56) that the authority of ACs impacts their 
effectiveness. Although also agreeing to this, one IA clarified that such authority is 
one derived from the Board and while such authority is “not executive”, ACs still 
cannot allow themselves to be a mere “rubber stamp”. One Regulator was neutral 
about this because in his/her view, more authority to the AC could easily 
“counterfire” by having the AC dominated by any one member. S/he explained that, 
the emphasis, rather than being on authority needs to be on the objectivity of 
members if an AC is to be effective. 
 
4.1.5 The Assessment of ACs 
Respondents agreed (x̅=3.13) that ACs are to carry out regular assessments of their 
performance. Such assessments are to include how far ACs have managed to keep 
their Boards informed of their workings as well as how far they reached their 
objectives in the previous year. Seven respondents noted that third parties are to be 
involved in carrying out such assessments.  
 
4.1.6 The Resources of ACs 
Regarding resources, respondents agreed (x̅=2.88) that these impact ACE. However, 




4.2.1 Appointment of Audit Committee Chairperson 
Respondents were provided with three statements on how an AC chairperson needs 
to be appointed and asked to rate their agreement with each one. 
  
Does an AC Chairperson need to be Appointed by the Board? 
Interviewees agreed (x̅=3.31) that an AC chairperson needs to be appointed by the 
Board. Two IAs explained that the vetting to become a director in an MLC is ever 
increasing, thus the Board undoubtedly has the capacity and experience to appoint an 
appropriate AC chairperson. One IA suggested that the Board needs to determine the 
AC composition yet still allow the AC members to appoint their chairperson.  
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Does an AC Chairperson need to be Recommended by the AC and Officially 
Appointed by the Board? 
Respondents were controversial (x̅=2.31) regarding this matter. While strongly 
agreeing or agreeing, seven respondents argued that AC members need to have a say 
in the decision. However, slightly more interviewees disagreed, stating as Board 
sub-committees, that ACs are not to be self-governing and therefore such a decision 
needs to be a matter for the whole Board.  
 
Does an AC Chairperson need to be Nominated by the Nomination Committee and 
Officially Appointed by the Board? 
Interviewees were controversial (x̅=2.31) on this matter as well. Seven (7/16) agreed 
or strongly agreed to this, despite that up to now many MLCs do not as yet have a 
Nomination Committee. However, marginally more respondents were neutral or 
disagreed, stating that ultimately the Board needs to decide this. Interestingly, 
EAs/Regulators agreed significantly more (p=0.037) than MLC representatives.  
 
Interviewees were then asked for their view on common practices in Malta with 
respect to the appointment of the AC chairperson. Interviewees clarified that in 
Malta it is the Board, which commonly appoints the AC chairperson. Two EAs 
argued that the Board usually appoints the NED who is competent in 
accounting/auditing as the AC chairperson. This is in line with Collier (1993). One 
IA qualified this, stating that this depends on whether such a person is independent 
besides being competent. 
 
4.2.2 Minimum Number of Audit Committee Members  
Interviewees were then asked to rate their agreement as to whether the degree of 
ACE is influenced by the size of the AC. Interviewees were neutral (x̅=2.31) on this. 
One Regulator, upon agreeing, added that if ACs become too large, there is a danger 
that meetings would easily be “paralysed”. Interviewees were then asked whether 
they think that the minimum number of three members stipulated by Maltese law is 
appropriate. Most agreed to this. Two IAs added that “three suffice, more is a crowd, 
only amplifying the challenges of reaching a consensus”. Two interviewees argued 
that such minimum varies with the needs of the MLC. One Regulator disagreed with 
the minimum, arguing that with three a quorum may easily be lost, impacting the 
number of meetings which ACs could hold. Interviewees were then asked whether 
they think that a maximum threshold needs to be established by law. Eleven 
respondents disagreed with this, arguing that Boards have the necessary skills to 
decide what is best for their company depending on the organisation’s complexity 
and size and ultimately it depends on the time the AC members have to give to the 
AC itself. Five agreed to have a maximum set by law setting such maximum as five, 
six or seven members.  
 
4.2.3 Member Competence in Accounting and/or Auditing  
It is to be noted that an analysis of the responses by eight IAs in the Respondent 
Characteristics Section of the interview schedule indicated that most members in 
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their own company’s ACs are qualified either in accounting/auditing or in 
information technology (IT). In this context, respondents were first asked what they 
consider to be a sufficient level of competence in accounting and/or auditing. 
Twelve comments referred to the requirement that the member at least needs to be a 
CPA. Moreover, other comments referred to a minimum requirement of ten years’ 
experience in the field of accounting/auditing, preferably in the company’s same 
industry. Three comments also referred to the need for members to keep abreast of 
current developments in the industry.  
 
Secondly, interviewees were asked whether they believe that having 
accounting/auditing expertise is essential for the proper functioning of ACs. 
Interviewees agreed, with six arguing, in line with BRC (1999), that financial 
statements have become so complex that such expertise is a sine qua non. 
Furthermore, four added that such competence does not have to be held by the 
chairperson.  
 
4.2.4 Other Competencies of Audit Committee Members  
Respondents were provided with four statements concerning the AC members’ 
required and actual competencies and asked to rate their agreement. The four 
statements were presented in two parts. In the first part, two statements were 
presented on the required and actual diversity of skills, background and experiences 
of AC members while, in the second part, two other statements were presented on 
the required and actual competencies of AC members in the specific sector in which 
the company is operating. 
 
Is an AC Better the more Diversity of Skills, Background and Experiences of its 
Members? 
Interviewees strongly agreed (x̅=3.63) that the more diversity of skills, background 
and experiences of the AC members, the better is such an AC. One IA mentioned 
that this also increases members’ independence since their competence prevents 
them from being dissuaded in certain instances.  
 
But do ACs in MLCs Actually have Sufficient Diversity of Skills, Background and 
Experiences? 
Respondents were neutral (x̅=2.19) on whether MLC ACs actually have sufficient 
skills, background and experiences. Furthermore in this connection, MLC 
representatives agreed to this significantly more(p=0.046) than the EAs/Regulators. 
Two EAs explained that, although ACs have improved, more diversity of skills is 
required. Additionally, one Regulator argued that this varies in the different sectors.  
 
Are the Majority of AC Members to be Competent in their Company’s Specific 
Sector? 
Respondents were neutral l (x̅=2.31) regarding this statement. Eleven argued that 
other competencies are important and thus there is no need for the majority to hold 
sector competence. This is in line with ECODA and PwC (2016). One EA argued 
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that this is essential, explaining that otherwise effective contribution would not be 
possible.  
 
But are the Majority of AC Members within MLCs Actually Competent in their 
Company’s Specific Sector? 
Interviewees were undecided (x̅=2.06) whether the majority of AC members within 
MLCs are actually competent in their company’s sector. Seven explained that only 
some members are competent in the sector. One EA agreed that the majority are 
competent in the sector but to different degrees. 
 
4.2.5 Independence of Audit Committee Members  
It is to be noted that an analysis of the responses by eight IAs in the Respondent 
Characteristics Section of the interview schedule indicated that most members in 
their company’s ACs are actually INEDs. Given this, ascertaining whether from all 
the respondents’ perspective AC members’ independence influences ACE is clearly 
relevant. In this connection, interviewees were asked to rate their agreement as to 
whether ACE is influenced by the degree of AC members’ independence. 
Respondents strongly agreed (x̅=3.81) to this statement. Three argued that this is 
imperative, as nothing is achieved if they are or even seen to be as “management’s 
puppets”. However, one IA argued that it is challenging to find independent 
members in Malta owing to both the country’s small size and the limited pool of 
qualified people.  
 
A further question asked respondents whether the Listing Rule requirement that the 
majority of AC members are to be independent is appropriate. Respondents agreed 
with this requirement, with two interviewees (2/16) adding that this was essential if 
AC members are to have a clear mindset to challenge management. Two 
interviewees specified that they have their reservations as the requirement can only 
deal with independence in appearance and not with effective independence which 
remains a  question of a “frame of mind”. Interviewees were then asked whether it 
would be an enhancement to AC member independence if, in addition to the current 
practices AC members have to declare that they are not, nor will they be, controlled 
or otherwise unduly influenced by any other non-member. Twelve interviewees 
stated that the requirement for such a declaration would be an enhancement. One 
added that such a declaration of independence is perhaps the only formal procedure 
which is needed in this regard and this might serve useful if AC members do breach 
their independence. However, four respondents claimed that such a declaration does 
not in itself add any comfort to shareholders.  
 
4.3 Authority and Resources 
 
4.3.1 Appointment and Oversight of External Auditors  
Interviewees were asked whether the AC Listing Rule requirement to recommend an 
EA and oversee their independence has reduced the impact of management 
association in the process. Interviewees’ responses were undecided with half 
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agreeing that management association has been reduced, although most added that 
this reduction had not been significant. This is in contrast to Dhaliwal et al. (2015) 
and Looknanan-Brown’s (2011) findings who found no such reduction. Three added 
that in view of the tendering process overseen by the AC, management can no longer 
select the EA behind closed doors. One IA clarified that in his/her organisation, the 
EA is chosen by the overseas AC of the parent company, this further reducing 
management association. However, eight interviewees disagreed that management 
association has been reduced. Five claimed that it would be “naïve” to believe in this 
reduction as management, especially the CFO, is still consulted and involved in the 
tender process, especially given the relatively smaller size of the average MLC. 
 
4.3.2 Monitoring the Financial Reporting Process  
It is to be noted that an analysis of the responses by eight IAs in the Respondent 
Characteristics Section of the interview schedule indicated that none of their 
respective companies have a separate Financial Reporting Committee. Given this, 
ascertaining from all the respondents’ perspective whether it is more effective to 
have a separate Financial Reporting Committee is clearly relevant. In this context, 
interviewees were asked whether it is more effective to have such a separate 
Committee examining all financial reports prior to ACs.  
 
Eleven interviewees argued against having a separate Financial Reporting 
Committee. Most commonly, respondents indicated that having properly structured 
ACs with more members competent in accounting/auditing would eliminate any 
need for such a Committee. Moreover, another subscribed opinion was that the 
introduction of another committee would be too cumbersome for many companies 
and might overlap with the respective AC. Two contended that as long as ACs are 
given reports well in advance of meetings to have time to raise their questions then 
there will be no such need. This is in line with Braiotta et al. (2010). Three 
respondents stated that this depends on the company’s resources and size. 
Contrastingly, another two agreed that such a separate Committee is needed as such 
a Committee adds to the robustness of the financial reporting process and ACs too 
often end up “overloaded”, with very long meetings that fail to meet their objectives.  
 
Furthermore, interviewees were asked whether such separate Financial Reporting 
Committees are actually common in Malta. Respondents stated that in their 
experience, such committees are not a common feature. 
 
4.3.3 Audit Committee’s Role in Risk Management Oversight  
It is to be noted that an analysis of the responses by eight IAs in the Respondent 
Characteristics Section of the interview schedule indicated that most of their 
respective companies have a separate Risk Management Committee. Given this, 
ascertaining from all the respondents’ perspective whether it is more effective to 
have a joint Audit and Risk Committee is clearly relevant. 
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In this regard, interviewees were asked whether, in their opinion, ACs should also 
carry out risk management oversight, even though several MLCs are developing a 
separate risk management oversight function.  
 
Six interviewees agreed that it would be more effective if ACs also carry out risk 
management oversight. Four explained that the IAF and risk function work closely 
together and reporting to the same committee will enable them to “share ideas and 
concerns” easily. Two stated that having an Audit and Risk Committee would 
reduce the risk of duplication or of overlooking important issues. However, five 
interviewees opposed the idea of having one joint committee. Three emphasised that 
under the Enterprise Risk Management Framework, “risk forms part of the 2nd line 
of defence, while audit part of the 3rd”. Two remarked that risk requirements have 
increased drastically, and therefore, it is essential to have a specific RM committee. 
Five interviewees argued that whether the two fall under one committee or not 
depends on three factors: the AC members’ competencies in risk, whether the 
industry is regulated or not and on the competences of the RM unit.  
 
Furthermore, respondents were asked whether, in their experience, such joint 
oversight of the AC is a common feature in MLCs. While three respondents 
preferred not to reply, seven held that this is not common and that usually there are 
two separate committees. Contrastingly, six interviewees argued that such additional 
AC oversight exists in small and probably non-listed companies. This is in line with 
Beasley et al. (2019). 
 
4.3.4 Right to Unrestricted Access 
Interviewees were then asked whether, in their view, it is invariably beneficial to 
grant ACs unrestricted access to any information, staff and management. 
Respondents agreed that such access is beneficial, which is in line with FRC (2016). 
Two qualified their response, adding that caution must be exercised so that such 
unrestricted access would not be abused.  
 
Interviewees were also asked whether they would extend such access towards 
allowing ACs to engage inhouse and/or external professional advisors. Interviewees 
agreed to both possibilities. With regards to external professionals two highlighted 
the importance that people of repute are employed to ensure confidentiality.  
 
Furthermore, interviewees were asked to rate, whether in their experience, ACs in 
MLCs generally have sufficient resources to ensure their effectiveness. Interviewees 
agreed(x̅=2.94) that generally AC resources are sufficient, with five adding that 
there still remains room for improvement. Six were neutral, stating that this depends 
on whether or not there is an IAF present in the company. Notably, MLC 
representatives agreed to this significantly more(p=0.025) than the EAs/Regulators. 
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4.4 Diligence  
 
In this connection, it is to be noted that an analysis of the responses by eight IAs in 
the Respondent Characteristics Section of the interview schedule indicated that the 
ACs in their own company meet more than four times a year, with an average of 
seven meetings per year. These three questions relating to the frequency and 
regularity of meetings may provide further insights on the MLC situation.  
 
4.4.1 Audit Committee Meeting  
Interviewees were asked whether, in their opinion, it is appropriate for the law to 
stipulate a minimum number of AC meetings. Most agreed, stating this ensures 
effectiveness. Four insisted that it is imperative that companies do not interpret this 
to meet four times only. One respondent disagreed with a minimum being set by 
law, arguing that it would be wiser to set a period which cannot elapse without 
holding an AC meeting. S/he emphasised that mandating a minimum of four 
meetings may result in companies “meeting four times in December”.  
 
Subsequently, those who agreed to a minimum being mandated were asked whether 
four is appropriate. Ten respondents agreed that once quarterly is normally enough 
but this varies with different companies. Five explained that a minimum of six 
meetings would be better, as this would ensure ACs meet at least bimonthly to keep 
abreast of the organisation’s developments.  
 
Respondents were then asked to rate their agreement with whether the meetings 
held, on average, by ACs in MLCs are sufficient to achieve their objectives. 
Respondents agreed (x̅=3.00) that the number of meetings typically held by ACs in 
MLCs are sufficient. One agreeing EA remarked that some ACs hold more than four 
meetings when the need arises. Conversely, three interviewees were neutral to such 
statement and claimed that several ACs meet simply to adhere to the Listing Rule 
requirement relating to frequency of meetings and that this is more common if the 
IAF is in its initial years. 
 
4.4.2 Audit Committee Meetings and Effectiveness  
Does the Frequency of AC Meetings Influence ACE? 
Respondents agreed(x̅=2.94) with the first statement that the degree of ACE is 
influenced by AC meeting frequency. Furthermore, MLC representatives agreed to 
this significantly more(p=0.015) than EAs/Regulators. One IA upon agreeing, added 
that meeting frequently is essential to keep in touch with and add value to the 
organisation. Conversely, five respondents were neutral, arguing that it is the quality 
of meetings that impacts ACE and the frequency is to depend on the organisation’s 
needs. This is in contrast with Aldamen et al. (2012) and DeZoort et al. (2002).  
 
4.4.3 Regular Participants in Audit Committee Meetings 
Interviewees were asked whether they agree to having the EAs, IAs and the financial 
controller as regular participants in AC meetings. Twelve agreed with their regular 
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participation. This is in contrast with Braiotta et al. (2010). One IA stated that 
however the meeting should still proceed if they do not attend. Another four 
disagreed to having such participants regularly in AC meetings. Two EAs upon 
disagreeing, argued that having the financial controller present throughout all 
meetings might discourage EAs from discussing certain issues. Respondents were 
next asked whether there are any other participants which they would consider to be 
regularly needed in AC meetings. Twelve interviewees commented that some other 
participants are needed as ‘regular’. Most commonly, the CEO was named because 
every decision taken ultimately impacts his/her terms of reference. The CRO and 
COO were also mentioned as important regular participants especially if the 
company is regulated. The Head of IT was also mentioned especially if the AC lacks 
technological expertise. Conversely, four interviewees mentioned that no one is 
required to be ‘regular’.  
 
Furthermore, the interviewees who disagreed with the regular participation of the 
EAs, IAs and the financial controller, were asked whether they could propose any 
alternative. These stated that the mentioned participants are to be “called in meetings 
as necessary” depending on the agenda. Moreover, two EAs argued that meetings 
should commence with only the AC members and secretary, then such participants 
are called in in their specific time slots.  
 
4.5 Internal Audit Contribution  
 
Respondents were then asked whether, in their view, ACs can achieve their 
objectives without the contribution of the IAF. Twelve respondents emphasised that 
ACs “definitely cannot” achieve their objectives without the IAF. However, nine of 
these added that the IAF’s contribution is only valued if internal audit reporting is 
done appropriately and the full audit reports together with executive summaries are 
passed on to the AC. Conversely, four interviewees stated that ACs can carry out 
some of their functions without an IAF but this would be challenging as to “gaining 
insight on the functioning of ICs” and ensuring “proper governance”. This is in line 
with the Chartered Institute of Internal Auditors (2015). 
 
Furthermore, interviewees were asked to rate how effective they consider the 
internal audit contribution to MLC ACs. Respondents agreed that such contribution 
is effective (x̅=3.31). Nine argued that internal audit reporting to ACs is effective 
because it is highly structured to ensure timeliness and appropriate interpretation, 
while still remaining flexible enough to allow for specific issues that might arise. 
Furthermore, three agreeing IAs insisted that, apart from the normal AC meetings, 
they hold regular meetings with the AC’s chairperson to keep him/her abreast with 
any developments.  
 
4.6 Assessment  
 
4.6.1 Audit Committee Self-Assessment 
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Interviewees were presented with two statements and asked to rate their agreement 
with each one, based on their experience in the Maltese scenario.  
 
Do Maltese ACs Carry Regular Assessment of their own Performance? 
Respondents were undecided (x̅=2.29) on this statement. Six strongly agreed or 
agreed to this, while most of the others disagreed, stating that this is to be carried out 
at Board rather than at AC level. Three were neutral to this statement arguing that 
this is only carried out where ACs have matured.  
 
Where Assessment is Carried out, does this Include the Quality of Communications 
with Boards and EAs? 
Respondents marginally agreed (x̅=2.57) to this statement. Eight strongly agreed or 
agreed. Six were neutral or disagreed with this stating that, although ACs maintain 
regular communications with Boards and EAs, they do not always assess how well 
this is done. 
 
4.6.2 Optimal method of audit Committee Assessment 
Respondents were provided with seven alternative parties who may carry out an 
assessment on ACs and asked for their opinion as to which would be the optimal 
party. Respondents were also allowed to provide any alternative not mentioned.  
 
Opinions regarding this question varied significantly. An assessment by the Board 
after receiving the report of an independent qualified consultant was the alternative 
most agreed to. Respondents pointed out that having an independent party 
evaluating AC work contributes towards improving ACE, and the Board would be in 
a better position to conclude its assessment. However, seven respondents opposed 
such an alternative arguing that an independent qualified consultant “increases 
bureaucracy” and is “the root to conflict”. Seven explained that perhaps the Board 
on its own would be in the best position to carry out such assessment as it is only the 
Board which is in the practicable position to carry oversight on the AC throughout 
the year. Furthermore, most interviewees disagreed with having the assessment 
carried out by the annual general meeting or the shareholders’ panel, arguing that 
these are “too distant” to be able to assess ACE. On the other hand, those agreeing 
with one of these alternative claimed that it is good practice to give shareholders a 
voice because they are ultimately the owners of the business.  
 
When presented with the option of providing any alternative to those mentioned 
above, one IA explained that within their organisation the IA, risk management unit, 
the CFO and the Board are asked to assess the AC every year through a formal 
document. One EA also argued that the best practice would be to have a mix, 
namely, an initial part by self-assessment, another part an independent qualified 
consultant and a final part by the Board. This is in line with FEE (2016).  
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4.7 Overall Effectiveness of Audit Committees  
 
Interviewees were finally asked to rate how effective are ACs in MLCs. 
Respondents agreed that ACs in MLCs are adequately effective with a mean of 
72.5%. Twelve interviewees added that there is room for improvement in ACE and 
this varies with the organisation, their resources and the importance given to the AC. 
Furthermore, two argued that in the light of certain scandals involving sanctions by 




5.1 Composition – Taste 
 
As stated earlier and also sustained in the findings, AC composition consists of four 
major elements. These are: the chairperson appointment, the AC size, member 
competence and member independence.  
 
5.1.1 Is the Appointment of the Audit Committee Chairperson to be Regulated? 
Collier (1993) argued that in most companies, the Board automatically appoints 
NEDs as AC members and selects the most competent one as the chairperson, 
sometimes after the recommendation of the AC members themselves. The findings 
also indicate that an AC chairperson needs to be appointed by the Board since MLC 
directors undoubtedly have the capacity to appoint the proper chairperson. In fact, as 
also confirmed in the findings, this is common practice in MLCs. On the other hand, 
it is probably optimal that AC members do not have a say in the chairperson’s 
appointment. Moreover, some interviewees also argued that the usual interpretation 
of chairperson competence is restricted to that in accounting/auditing areas. 
Furthermore, while this may be understandable, the findings indicate that for ACE to 
be enhanced, the selection of the chairperson must not merely pivot on such 
competence but, perhaps even more importantly, also takes his/her independence 
well into consideration.   
 
The FRC (2016) and Baldacchino et al. (2018) took this a step further by arguing 
that the Board needs to heed the nominations of the Nomination Committee when 
appointing AC members and the chairperson. Interestingly, the findings indicate that 
EAs and Regulators agreed more to this alternative than the MLC representatives. 
This may suggest that the more independent parties emphasise  the objectivity aspect 
more in such an appointment. This gives rise to the question as to whether it is time 
perhaps to make the Nominations Committee a mandatory committee within MLCs 
– and this to ensure that the appropriate members and chairperson are appointed as 
part of the AC. 
 
5.1.2 Audit Committees-Too Large or too Small?  
Although the Listing Rules specify that ACs need to be composed of at least three 
members, AC size remains a highly controversial aspect of AC composition. 
P.J. Baldacchino, N.Tabone, E.M. Debono, S. Grima 
  
41  
However, the findings suggest that it is ultimately the time which AC members have 
at their disposal which will impact their effectiveness. Furthermore, contrary to the 
literature, the findings suggest that, with more members, fewer meetings are 
typically held in view of the issue of agreeing on the meeting dates. Additionally, 
even if meeting frequency remains satisfactory, the presence of too many speakers in 
a meeting might result in participation ineffectiveness.  
 
Ultimately, the findings indicate that the appropriate AC size is not a one-size-fits-
all but varies particularly with business complexity and the resulting variety in 
member skillsets. As such, it would probably be beneficial if a range rather in 
addition to the minimum number of members is indicated in the Listing Rules. In 
addition to retaining the rarely disputed relevance of a minimum, this would also 
introduce an allowance for the circumstantial flexibility needed by different MLCs. 
Rather than being prescriptive, the Rules may also permit such a range to be 
exceeded, subject to well-grounded justification.  
 
5.1.3 What is Financial Competence and is this Enough? 
DeZoort et al. (2002) emphasises that AC member competence is an essential 
precondition for ACE. In this regard, the regulatory framework mandates that at 
least, one member is to be competent in accounting and/or auditing and that the AC 
as a whole is competent in the company’s specific sector may not be enough. What 
level of financial competence would suffice? Probably, even the quote by Micallef 
(2015) of having “an individual with a financial mind” does not resolve the issue. In 
fact, this study has found clear indications that a sufficient level of competence in 
accounting/auditing would entail someone being both warranted in 
accounting/auditing and having a post-warrant number of years of experience in the 
field. In line with BRC (1999), interviewees also argued that, the required expertise 
must be enough for AC members to fully understand ever-more-complex financial 
statements.  
 
Furthermore, the corporate scandals of the 20th century and the financial crisis of 
2007-2009 resulted in regulatory agencies heavily scrutinising ACs, placing more 
onus on them and further extending their composition and responsibilities. Clearly, 
this suggests the overriding belief of regulatory authorities that if better equipped, 
ACs could do a better job. A relevant point of issue here is whether financial 
competence is in itself sufficient, even if it is defined more widely as argued above. 
In this context, the findings indicate that the more diversity in the background of 
skills and experiences of the AC members, the more effective will such an AC be – a 
diversity as yet clearly lacked by Maltese ACs. It is probably best if such diversity 
includes formal qualifications in law, compliance and IT. However, one probably 
needs to ensure that such diversity does not come at the expense of lower financial 
acumen.  
 
Regarding specific sector competence, in line with ECODA and PwC (2016), the 
findings suggest that there is no need for the majority of members to be competent in 
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a company’s specific sector as other competences contribute to ACE. In line with 
this, interview respondents pointed out that the majority of AC members in MLCs 
do not actually have specific sector competence. In this light, the regulatory 
framework specifying the need for ACs as a whole to have specific sector 
competence probably needs to be clarified so as to limit such specific competence to 
a minimum, say one or two members. 
 
5.1.4 Member Independence-Fact or Fiction?    
As already stated earlier in this chapter and also in the literature, independence is of 
such importance that it needs to be a principal determinant when appointing AC 
members. Interviewees emphasised that nothing is achieved if the members do not 
retain a clear mindset to question and challenge management. However, there is no 
clear definition of what makes a director independent but only suggested guidelines. 
The findings  indicate that such guidelines are accepted by MLCs and that once they 
hold true, members are deemed to be independent. Yet, independence in fact still 
remains a frame of mind and it is only independence in appearance which may be 
determined by compliance to the regulatory framework. Beyond this, attempts may 
only be made to determine real independence subjectively on a case-by-case basis 
and this in line with FEE (2016). Furthermore, within the Maltese context, there is 
the further limitation of a small state with a limited pool of qualified persons. Could 
it be that MLCs find themselves necessarily choosing from the same pool of persons 
whom they closely know and trust? Perhaps one way out could be that of going 
beyond Maltese shores to trace potential AC members, or at least, of going beyond 
the circle of close relationships. 
 
Interestingly, when provided with the option, interviewees agreed that AC members 
should be made to formally declare their independence. Instead of setting up more 
guidelines as to what considerations determine AC member independence, 
regulators could probably enhance AC member accountability by making such a 
formal declaration by them a statutory requirement, prior to their acceptance of AC 
membership. However, further research is needed in this regard. 
 
5.2 Authority and Resources – Sight  
 
AC authority is claimed by DeZoort et al. (2002) to be drawn from its 
responsibilities and thus mainly hinges on three main factors. These are: 
recommending the appointment of the EA, overseeing the financial reporting 
process, and monitoring ICs and RM systems. Moreover, it requires adequate access 
to resources for the AC to enforce its authority. 
 
5.2.1 Authority-Is the Audit Committee Doing Enough? 
Is AC Deciding Better than Recommending the External Auditor Appointment? 
According to Dhaliwal et al. (2015), regulatory agencies in America were of the 
opinion that the EA independence was being jeopardised as auditors were becoming 
increasingly sympathetic to the management’s position. In fact, with the enactment 
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of new EP regulations, the AC was made responsible for recommending an EA to 
the Board so that management association in the selection process would be 
minimised. However, the findings were controversial as to whether, with such an 
AC recommendation, management association did in fact decrease. Perhaps it is 
time for the Listing Rules to allow the AC to select the EA and not merely 
recommend to the Board. However, even with an AC appointment, if management is 
still consulted in the process, this could be self-defeating. Moreover, this has been 
the US experience, where according to Looknanan-Brown (2011) and Dhaliwal et al. 
(2015), although the SOX has made the AC directly responsible in appointing the 
EA, management affiliation continued to be seen in the selection process. Probably, 
rather than being a  matter of the AC recommending versus deciding, it is more a 
question of how widely the AC consults prior to its action.  
 
Is the Oversight of the Financial Reporting Process a Burden for Audit Committees? 
As explained by Braiotta et al. (2010), financial reporting is becoming more 
complex, intricate and regulated. Yet the AC is still charged to oversee the financial 
reporting process, albeit having several other responsibilities. However, the strong 
indications are that Maltese ACs should still keep fulfilling such a responsibility and 
that there is no need to have a separate Financial Reporting Committee charged with 
overseeing the financial reports prior to ACs. In fact, in line with the ACI (2017), 
interviewees believe that, as long as ACs are given the required information in time 
and also kept abreast with any significant developments, they would also be 
effective in fulfilling such a responsibility. While, such a separate Committee could 
itself contribute to the robustness of the financial reporting process, with the AC 
retaining such a responsibility, more system coherence and integration as well as 
better oversight may probably be attained. 
 
Are Audit Committees to Monitor Risk Management Systems? 
As explained in the literature, one of the responsibilities of ACs is to monitor IC and 
RM systems without infringing on their independence. However, although in recent 
years several MLCs have developed their separate RM oversight functions, the 
findings indicate that both a separate committee and a joint committee could be 
doable. On the one hand, it may be effective if ACs continue to oversee the RM 
systems as long as there are adequate risk-related competences among AC members. 
One argument towards taking this stance is that since, in any case, the internal audit 
and risk functions need to liaise closely in their work, it may be more fruitful to have 
them reporting to the same joint committee. Contrastingly and in line with the 
American study of Bujno et al. (2018), one may claim that it might be more 
effective if a separate RM oversight committee is given responsibility for monitoring 
RM systems and this because of the drastically increased significance in recent years 
of risk management and oversight. In this connection, the current regulatory 
framework makes it mandatory for credit institutions to have such a separate RM 
Committee mainly due to the higher significance being given to their regulation. 
Probably this regulatory framework is an acceptable compromise because the 
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responsibility of ACs for monitoring RM systems is thus only retained in those 
industries which are not too significantly exposed to risks. 
 
5.2.2 Resources – Are they Adequate? 
According to DeZoort et al. (2002), adequate AC oversight depends on whether the 
AC has the necessary resources to function. The findings confirmed that unrestricted 
access to information, staff and management that ACs might require is invariably 
beneficial and enhances ACE, with the proviso that such access is well taken 
advantage of. Furthermore, the findings indicate that AC resources within MLCs are 
generally sufficient to ensure their effectiveness. However, the fact that MLC 
representatives are more of the opinion than EAs and Regulators that such resources 
are sufficient indicates that it could be that the available resources are not being 
utilised in the best possible way. In this connection, improved communications 
among the stakeholders including Regulators, EAs and also shareholders, could 
promote better use of such resources or at least align their different perceptions on 
the matter. The FEE (2016) advocates such improved communications if the 
interested parties are to undertake their responsibilities better. Moreover, further 
research is needed in this regard. 
 
5.3 Diligence – Hearing  
 
One valid proxy used to measure diligence is “the number of AC meetings held per 
year” (DeZoort et al. 2002). Although the Listing Rules mandate a minimum of four 
meetings every year, Aldamen et al. (2012) and DeZoort et al. (2002) contend that 
the more meetings held, the more effective is the AC oversight likely to be. It is 
clear from the findings that the degree of ACE is influenced by the frequency of AC 
meetings. However they also indicate that ACE is influenced by the quality of such 
meetings. Furthermore, although mandating a statutory minimum number of 
meetings might ensure ACE, it might be wiser to set a period which cannot elapse 
without a meeting being held. This could ensure that AC oversight of operations is 
not sporadic but continuous. Notwithstanding this, the number of meetings typically 
held by ACs in MLCs is claimed to be sufficient for ACs to be effective. Yet, the 
suspicion looms that some of these ACs meet only to fulfil the minimum 
requirements of the law. As such, it might therefore be wiser to compel such 
committees to meet more by setting the statutory minimum to six meetings per year.  
 
Several authors have argued that certain problems tend to arise if insufficient 
meetings are held. In this regard, the findings point towards irregular AC meetings 
leading to unsolved financial reporting problems and an increased number of 
restatements although not necessarily to the higher probability of fraud. 
Contrastingly, the argument may be made that such issues do not depend on the 
frequency of AC meetings but on IAF diligence. In fact, this appears to be a major 
belief of MLC representatives and yet significantly less that of EAs and Regulators. 
Could this indicate lingering MLC dilemmas about the possible roles of their ACs? 
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Perhaps, it would be beneficial if all three parties exchange their opinions more 
about their perceived remits of ACs so that these are ultimately best established.  
 
Furthermore, the FEE (2016) explained that AC meetings should not be taken over 
by management while Braiotta et al. (2010) argued that management should not 
even be present in AC meetings. In contrast, the findings suggest that the financial 
controller, the CEO, CRO and COO need to participate regularly in AC meetings 
together with EAs and IAs, though possibly not for the whole duration of the 
meetings. However, it is probably better that such participants, with the exception of 
IAs and possibly EAs, who are not part of management, are only invited to the 
meetings as necessary, depending on the agenda. They might also be informed as to 
when AC meetings are being held so that they remain on call for possible 
questioning or consultation by the AC. Such arrangement might help to ensure that 
strong member of management hijacks the AC meetings. 
 
5.4 Internal Audit Contribution – Touch  
 
According to Cadbury (1992), the role of IAFs is fundamental in aiding ACs to 
achieve their objectives as IAs continuously monitor the company’s basic controls 
and processes. Moreover, the IAF provides the organisation’s governing bodies with 
independent assurance. The findings do confirm that ACs “definitely cannot” or 
“would find it extremely challenging” to achieve their objectives without the 
contribution of the IAF. The question, therefore, undoubtedly arises as to why IAFs 
are not mandated by the Listing Rules although ACs are. Probably it would be a 
great enhancement to ACE if the introduction of IAFs in MLCs is also mandated.  
 
5.5 Assessment – Smell  
 
The ACI (2017) emphasises that it is essential for ACs to carry out a regular 
assessment of their own activities. Moreover, since the type of assessment is not 
actually specified, this often takes the form of self-assessment. The findings indicate 
that such self-assessment is not being carried out by all ACs in MLCs but only by 
mature ACs. Furthermore, when such an assessment is carried out, it might not 
include AC communication with Boards and EAs. This lack of assessment might 
actually hinder the effectiveness of such communication and that of the AC. 
 
Additionally, the FEE (2016) pointed out that since ACs have been given greater 
importance, then perhaps an external stakeholder should be involved in their 
assessment process. In this regard, the indications are that such external assessment 
might be needed in Maltese ACs. In fact, the preference seems to be for an 
independent qualified consultant being involved in the AC assessment process. An 
issue that arises in this context is the qualifications, experience and required 
independence of such a consultant. Again, would it be better for such a person or 
entity to have financial competences or, insofar as is possible, wider competences on 
the same basis as the collective competences of the AC? Furthermore, it may be that 
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such persons or entities are not yet easily available in a small country. Perhaps, 
further research is needed in this regard.   
 
Are Audit Committees in Maltese Listed Companies Effective?  
Finally, the findings seem to indicate that ACs in MLCs are adequately effective, yet 
there still remains room for improvement albeit the recent developments. 
 
Table 1. Strength of Relationship with Qn.20   




Qn.17.B – Re Internal Audit Contribution  3.31 0.155 0.567 
Qn.14.C – Re Diligence  3.00 0.023 0.931 
Qn.13.C – Re Authority and Resources 2.94 0.650 0.006* 
Qn.15.A – Re Diligence  2.94 0.461 0.073 
Qn.18.ii – Re Assessment  2.57 0.119 0.684 
Qn.5.A – Re Composition 2.31 0.227 0.397 
Qn.18.i – Re Assessment  2.29 0.174 0.551 
Qn.7.A.2 – Re Composition  2.19 0.185 0.492 
Qn.7.B.2 – Re Composition  2.06 0.408 0.117 
Average Mean Rating Score of 9 Qns. 2.63 Friedman Test:  
X2(1) = 1.000, p = 0.317 Mean Rating Score of Overall Qn. 20 2.90 
Note: *0 = Strongly Disagree/Highly Ineffective/Not Sufficient at All 
4= Strongly Agree/Highly Effective/Highly Sufficient 
Source: Own study. 
 
As may be seen, the Spearman Correlation between the interviewees’ opinion on 
each specific individual question targeting the determinants of ACE and their 
opinion derived from the overall question (Qn.20) is positive, thus indicating that 
participants who agreed to the individual questions also agreed to the overall 
question and vice versa. However, the p-value of such positive relationships 
indicates that they were not significant, but rather weak, with the exception of the 
relationship of the second determinant – AC resources (Qn.13.C) with the overall 
question. The interpretation in the latter case is that interviewees who held the 
opinion that AC resources in MLCs are sufficient for them to achieve their 
objectives, argued to a significantly similar degree that ACs in MLCs are in general 
effective.  
 
Furthermore, the interviewee impression derived from the overall question seems to 
be somewhat optimistic(x̅=2.90) with respect to effectiveness while if one compares 
such overall impression with that indicated by the average mean rating scores of the 
individual nine questions, then one finds that the latter is relatively marginally 
(although not significantly) less effective(x̅=2.63). One may also note substantial 
variations between most specific individual questions and the overall question, such 
variations being therefore indicative of either lower or higher perceptions of ACE in 
the response to such questions. In particular, interviewee perceptions relating to the 
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internal audit contribution (Qn.17.B) is much more optimistic (x̅=3.31) than their 
overall perception, while interviewee perception of company specific-sector 
competence (Qn.7.B.2) is much more pessimistic(x̅=2.06).  
 
Therefore, the indications are that Maltese ACs are generally effective but also that 
such effectiveness could be higher and that certain determinants of ACE are as yet 




This study concludes that, while Maltese ACs are generally effective, such 
effectiveness could be higher and certain determinants of ACE are as yet much less 
effective. Therefore, more needs to be done in terms of regulation and also in terms 
of better communication among the relevant parties. 
 
While the regulatory framework does regulate AC composition, a revision of such 
regulation might aid in increasing ACE. The appointment of members and the 
chairperson is still left up to the discretion of the members of the Board, who should 
have the necessary expertise and experience to make the right decision, even if this 
leaves the possibility of preferential appointments. In order to avoid a one-size-fits-
all approach, mandating a range of AC members could allow the flexibility desired 
in this regard. As yet the Listing Rules do not clarify what is exactly meant by AC 
member competence and this leaves a dilemma about the relative significance of 
experience as against qualifications. Additionally, independence still is, and remains, 
a subjective issue. Although independence in appearance could perhaps be enhanced 
by the introduction of a mandatory declaration of independence, in practice 
independence always remains a question of frame of mind.  
 
With respect to authority and resources of ACs, the study concludes that the AC 
remit could be widened in certain instances and narrowed in others to ensure 
effectiveness while reducing the AC’s burden. In the first instance, although the AC 
is responsible in recommending an EA to the Board, management association in the 
process is still present. Moreover, ACs are still the committee charged with 
overseeing the financial reporting process and RM systems in most MLCs. In this 
regard, it is time to widen the remit of the AC to authorise it to choose, rather than to 
merely recommend the EA. At the same time, such remit is to be narrowed by 
alleviating the AC from the burden of overseeing the financial reporting process and 
RM systems. Finally, although AC resources might be sufficient for ACs to achieve 
their objectives, they probably need to make a better case at persuading stakeholders 
that such resources are being put to the best possible use.   
 
AC diligence is an essential prerequisite for ACE. Most MLCs seem to understand 
the importance of having sufficient AC meetings. However, there still remain some 
ACs who seem to meet simply to undertake the expected rituals. Amendments to the 
Listing Rules might help in this regard. Moreover, controversy exists as to whether 
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AC meetings are actually being taken over by management. Whatever the case, it is 
probably better if the regulatory framework imposes safeguards to ensure free and 
effective discussions in such meetings. With respect to the internal audit 
contribution to ACs, this study concludes that this is an extremely valued resource 
within MLCs. However, paradoxically the Maltese Listing Rules do not as yet 
mandate the statutory obligation to establish IAFs within MLCs. This is perhaps one 
of the most significant effectiveness gaps within the regulatory framework crying to 
be addressed.  
 
In terms of AC assessment, this study concludes that the present assessments being 
carried out only by some MLCs, which are commonly self-assessments, leave much 
to be desired. There seem to be increased calls for improved and more objective 
assessments which may be precipitated by appropriate legislation.  
 
Elements of controversy tend to remain with respect to the effectiveness of ACs 
given that different participants tend to evaluate such effectiveness limitedly from 
their own perspective. As has been seen, increased regulation and inter-party 
communications may be helpful in this regard. Furthermore, by their understanding 
of how ACs may add real value to their organisations, MLCs will be able to stay 
ahead in ensuring sound governance in the interest of their stakeholders. In this 
context, it is clear that, in the same manner that all the five senses are essential for 
the human body in order to function properly, the five common aspects analysed in 
this study are all needed if ACs are to achieve their objectives. Indeed, as stated by 
one MLC representative, “it ultimately boils down to the effectiveness of the senses 
themselves to have a truly effective human body”. 
 
Declarations and Acknowledgements: 
**This article is based on a dissertation submitted in May 2020 in partial fulfilment 
of the requirements for the award of the Master in Accountancy degree in the 
Department of Accountancy at the Faculty of Economics, Management and 
Accountancy at the University of Malta by Debono E.M. supervised by Baldacchino, 
P.J. 
Ethics approval: 




Aldamen, H., Duncan, K., Kelly, S., Mcnamara, R., Nagel, S. 2012. Audit Committee 
Characteristics And Firm Performance During The Global Financial Crisis. Accounting 
& Finance, 52(4), 971-1000. Doi: 10.1111/J.1467-629x.2011.00447.X.  
Al-Najjar, B. 2011. The Determinants Of Audit Committee Independence And Activity: 
Evidence From The Uk.(Report). International Journal Of Auditing, 15(2), 191-203. 
Doi: 10.1111/J.1099-1123.2011.00429.X.  
Audit Committee Institute (ACI). 2017. Audit Committee Handbook. Ireland, Audit 
Committee Institute.  
P.J. Baldacchino, N.Tabone, E.M. Debono, S. Grima 
  
49  
Baldacchino, P.J., Gatt, J., Tabone, N., Bezzina, F. 2018. The Nomination Committee In 
Maltese Listed Companies. 6th International Ofel Conference On Governance, 
Management And Entrepreneurship. New Business Models And Institutional 
Entrepreneurs: Leading Disruptive Change, April 13th - 14th, Dubrovnik, Croatia, 
Zagreb: Governance Research And Development Centre (Ciru), 125-139. 
Beasley, M. 1996. An Empirical Analysis Of The Relation Between The Board Of Director 
Composition And Financial Statement Fraud. The Accounting Review, 71(4), 443-465. 
Doi: 10.2307/248566.  
Beasley, M.S., Branson, B.C., Hancock, B.V. 2019. The State Of Risk Oversight: An 
Overview Of Enterprise Risk Management Practices. Aicpa.  
Beasley, M.S., Carcello, J.V., Hermanson, D.R. 1999. Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1987-
1997: An Analysis Of U.S. Public Companies. New York, Coso.  
Bédard, J., Courteau, L., Chtourou, S.M. 2004. The Effect Of Audit Committee Expertise, 
Independence, and Activity On Aggressive Earnings Management. Auditing, 23(2), 13-
35. Doi: 10.2308/Aud.2004.23.2.13.  
Bezzina, F., Grima, S. 2012. Exploring Factors Affecting The Proper Use Of Derivatives: An 
Empirical Study With Active Users And Controllers Of Derivatives. Managerial 
Finance, Vol. 38, No. 4, 414-434. 
Bezzina, F., Grima, S., Mamo, J. 2014. Risk Management Practices Adopted By Financial 
Firms in Malta. Managerial Finance, Vol. 40, No. 6, 587-567. 
Braiotta, L.J., Gazzaway, R.T., Colson, R.H., Ramamoorti, S. 2010. The Audit Committee 
Handbook. New Jersey, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
Braun, V., Clarke, V. 2006. Using Thematic Analysis In Psychology. Qualitative Research In 
Psychology, 3(2), 77-101. 
Briguglio, L. 1995. Small Island Developing States And Their Economic Vulnerabilities. 
World Development, Vol. 23, No. 9, 1615-1632. 
Bromilow, C.L., Keller, D.P. 2011. Audit Committee Effectiveness What Works Best. 
Florida, The Institute of Internal Auditors Research Foundation.  
Bujno, M., Hitchcock, C., Parsons, K., Lamm, B. 2018. The Role Of The Audit Committee. 
United Kingdom, Deloitte.  
Camilleri, Y. 2016. Recent Trends In Audit Committees Of Maltese Listed Companies. 
M.Accty Dissertation, Malta, University Of Malta. 
Https://Www.Um.Edu.Mt/Library/Oar//Handle/123456789/12995.   
Cavaleros, G. 2013. Internal Audit. Accountancy, 20-22.  
Chartered Institute Of Internal Auditors. 2015. How Internal Audit Works With The Audit 
Committee. Chartered Institute Of Internal Auditors.  
Collier, P.A. 1993. Audit Committees In Major Uk Companies. Managerial Auditing Journal, 
8(3), 25-30. Doi: 10.1108/02686909310036241.  
Dezoort, F., Hermanson, D., Archambeault, D., Reed, S. 2002. Audit Committee 
Effectiveness: A Synthesis Of The Empirical Audit Committee Literature. Journal Of 
Accounting Literature, 21, 38-75.   
Dhaliwal, D., Lamoreaux, P., Lennox, C., Mauler, L. 2015. Management Influence On 
Auditor Selection And Subsequent Impairments Of Auditor Independence During The 
Post-Sox Period. Contemporary Accounting Research, 32(2), 575-607. Doi: 
10.1111/1911-3846.12079. 
Farrugia, V. 2006. The Effectiveness Of The Internal Audit Function In Maltese Public 
Limited Companies: An Assessment. B.Accty.(Hons) Dissertation, Malta, University 
Of Malta.   
         Audit Committees in Maltese Listed Companies and their Perceived Effectiveness:  
An Assessment 
 50  
 
 
Ferreira, I. 2008. The Effect Of Audit Committee Composition And Structure On The 
Performance Of Audit Committees. Meditari Accountancy Research, 16(2), 89-106. 
Doi: 10.1108/10222529200800014. 
Harrell, M.C., Bradley, M.A. 2009. Data Collection Methods. Semi-Structured Interviews 
And Focus Groups. USA, Rand Corporation.  
Institute Of Internal Auditors (IIA). 2013. The Three Lines Of Defense In Effective Risk 
Management And Control. Florida, IIA.  
Kalbers, L., Fogarty, T. 1993. Audit Committee Effectiveness: An Empirical Investigation 
Of The Contribution Of Power. Auditing, 12(1), 24. 
King, R. 1993. The Geographical Fascination Of Islands. In: Lockhart, D.G., Drakakis-
Smith, D., Schembri, J. (Eds), The Development Process In Small Island States. 
Routledge, London, 13-37. 
Le Riche, N. 2014. Internal Audit. Accountancy Sa, 22-23. 
Looknanan-Brown, V. 2011. Are The Regulatory Reforms Working? Evidence From Audit 
Committee Members' Selection Of Auditors. Michigan, Proquest Dissertations 
Publishing.  
Mangena, M., Pike, R. 2005. The Effect Of Audit Committee Shareholding, Financial 
Expertise And Size On Interim Financial Disclosures. Accounting And Business 
Research, 35(4), 327-349. Doi: 10.1080/00014788.2005.9729998.  
Mcintosh, M.J., Morse, J.M. 2015. Situating And Constructing Diversity In Semi-Structured 
Interviews. Global Qualitative Nursing Research, 2, 1-12. Doi: 
10.1177/2333393615597674.  
Micallef, S.D. 2015. The Role And Effectiveness Of Audit Committees In General Insurance 
Companies. M.Accty. Dissertation, Malta, University Of Malta. 
Https://Www.Um.Edu.Mt/Library/Oar//Handle/123456789/8476.  
Raghunandan, K., Rama, D.V. 2007. Determinants Of Audit Committee Diligence. 
Accounting Horizons, 21(3), 265-279.   
Rochmah Ika, S., Mohd Ghazali, N.A. 2012. Audit Committee Effectiveness And Timeliness 
Of Reporting: Indonesian Evidence. Managerial Auditing Journal, 27(4), 403-424. Doi: 
10.1108/02686901211217996.  
Roussy, M., Rodrigue, M. 2016. Internal Audit: Is The 'Third Line Of Defense' Effective As 
A Form Of Governance? An Exploratory Study Of The Impression Management 
Techniques Chief Audit Executives Use In Their Annual Accountability To The Audit 
Committee. Business Ethics, 151(3), 853-869. Doi: 10.1007/S10551-016-3263-Y.  
Vera-Muñoz, S.C. 2005. Corporate Governance Reforms: Redefined Expectations Of Audit 
Committee Responsibilities And Effectiveness. Journal Of Business Ethics, 62(2), 115-




Blue Ribbon Committee On Improving The Effectiveness Of Corporate Audit Committees 
(BRC). 1999. Report And Recommendations Of The Blue Ribbon Committee On 
Improving The Effectiveness Of Corporate Audit Committees. The Business Lawyer, 
54(3), 1067-1095.   
Cadbury, A. 1992. Report Of The Committee On The Financial Aspects Of Corporate 
Governance. London, UK, Gee.   
European Confideration Of Directors Association (ECODA) And Price water house coopers 
(PWC), 2016. Guidance For Audit Committees. Brussels, Ecoda.  
P.J. Baldacchino, N.Tabone, E.M. Debono, S. Grima 
  
51  
European Confederation Of Institutes Of Internal Auditing (ECIIA) And Federation Of 
European Risk Management Associations (FERMA). 2014. Audit And Risk 
Committees News From EU Legislation And Best Practices. Brussels, ECIIA.  
Federation Of European Accountants (FEA). 2016. The Impact Of The Audit Reform On 
Audit Committees In Europe. Brussels, Fee.  
Financial Reporting Council (FRC). 2016. Guidance On Audit Committees. London, The 
Financial Reporting Council Limited.  
Listing Authority – Malta. 2019. Listing Rules: Https://Www.Mfsa.Mt/Wp- 
Content/Uploads/2019/07/20190530_Fulllistingrulesamendments.Pdf. 
Sarbanes, P. 2002. Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. In The Public Company Accounting Reform 
And Investor Protection Act. Washington DC, U.S. Congress. 
